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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher C. Tapp appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
(Docket No. 25295) 1 
The state charged Tapp with, and a jury convicted him of, first-degree 
murder, rape, and a weapon enhancement for use of a deadly weapon during the 
commission of the murder and rape of Angie Dodge in her apartment in Idaho 
Falls. State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 354, 33 P.3d 828 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Tapp I"). 
Prior to trial, Tapp filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police 
during various interviews, which the district court granted in part and denied in 
part. (#25295 R., Vol. II, pp.198-99.) The Idaho Court of Appeals set forth the 
facts underlying the suppression issue as follows: 
Early in the morning of June 13, 1996, Angie Dodge was 
raped and stabbed to death in her apartment in Idaho Falls. On 
January 7, 1997, twenty-year-old Christopher Tapp voluntarily 
submitted to police questioning about this crime at the Law 
Enforcement Building (LEB) in Idaho Falls. Tapp again voluntarily 
went to the LEB for questioning on January 10. After this interview, 
Tapp's parents retained private counsel for their son. When Tapp 
did not appear at the LEB for another scheduled interview on 
January 11, police officers went to his home to find him. They were 
informed by Tapp's mother that an attorney had been retained and 
that Tapp would appear on January 13, with counsel, to answer 
more questions. Approximately one hour later, the Idaho Falls chief 
of police arrived at the Tapp home and attempted to convince 
Tapp's mother to change her mind about her son's refusal to be 
1 The district court took judicial notice of the record and transcripts in Tapp's 
underlying criminal case, Bonneville County Case No. CR-1997-97281 (Docket 
No. 25295). (R., p.78; Exhibits.) 
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interviewed without assistance of counsel. She refused. Rather 
than waiting for a voluntary interview on January 13, law 
enforcement officials obtained a warrant to arrest Tapp on a charge 
of accessory to a felony, Idaho Code§§ 18-205, -206, and he was 
arrested on January 11. 
After making the arrest, an officer put Tapp in an interview 
room and called Tapp's attorney. Before the attorney's arrival, the 
officer initiated a discussion with Tapp about the type of information 
the police wanted to obtain from him. On January 13, another 
attorney joined in Tapp's representation as co-counsel. Thereafter, 
Tapp was interviewed, while under arrest and in police custody, on 
January 15 and 17. During all interviews at the LEB from January 
15 forward, Tapp was separated from his attorneys. The attorneys 
were placed in a nearby office in the LEB where they were allowed 
to observe the interviews on a closed-circuit television. Tapp's only 
contact with his attorneys was during breaks in the interviews. His 
attorneys apparently made no objection to this arrangement. 
In the first interviews Tapp denied having any knowledge of 
the crime, then claimed that Ben Hobbs had confessed to killing 
Dodge and had asked Tapp to help him with an alibi. Tapp denied 
having ever been at the crime scene. By January 15 and 17, 
however, Tapp's story was changing, and he admitted that he had 
accompanied Hobbs to Dodge's apartment on the night of the 
murder. Tapp told police that Hobbs wanted to confront Dodge 
because Hobbs believed that she had convinced Hobbs's wife to 
leave him. Tapp claimed that Hobbs and Dodge started fighting 
and that Hobbs punched Dodge and then stabbed her twice. Tapp 
asserted that he ran from the apartment at that point. He admitted 
that he returned later and found Dodge dead and no one else 
present. Tapp also implicated a man named Jeremy Sargis in the 
crime. Tapp said he believed that the murder weapon belonged to 
Sargis, but he initially claimed that Sargis was not in the apartment 
that night. Eventually, however, Tapp accused Sargis of helping to 
rape and murder Dodge. 
On January 15, Tapp and the State entered into a "limited 
use immunity" agreement, and on January 17 they entered into a 
"cooperation and settlement agreement." These agreements 
(hereinafter referred to collectively as the "immunity agreements") 
required Tapp to cooperate with the police investigation of Dodge's 
death and to provide the police with truthful information about the 
crime. Tapp also agreed to plead guilty to aiding and abetting an 
aggravated battery, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-903, -907, and the State 
agreed not to file any other charge against Tapp related to Dodge's 
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death. The State also promised to recommend at the sentencing 
hearing that the district court retain jurisdiction for a limited period 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (4), and to allow withdrawal of the guilty 
plea if the judge did not follow the recommendation. The State also 
agreed not to use any of Tapp's statements against him except for 
impeachment purposes. As a consequence of the immunity 
agreements, the pending charge against Tapp for accessory to 
felony was dismissed on January 17 and he was released from 
custody. 
Tapp was again questioned on January 18 and 29. Before 
the January 29 interview began, the prosecutor informed Tapp and 
his attorney that the prosecutor considered the immunity 
agreements with Tapp to be void because Tapp had not been 
truthful in describing the crime. The prosecutor explained that 
Tapp's contention that Hobbs and Sargis were the rapists was 
contradicted by DNA tests showing that semen found on Dodge's 
body and clothing did not come from either of those men (or from 
Tapp). Despite this declaration from the prosecutor, Tapp and one 
of his attorneys continued with the January 29 interview. On that 
date, Tapp was given a polygraph test, during which he asked to be 
taken to the apartment where the murder occurred. Tapp's 
attorney agreed that the police could take Tapp to the crime scene 
for further questioning, but the attorney declined to accompany 
Tapp and the officers. Once at the crime scene, Tapp made 
statements implicating himself in the crimes. At the crime scene 
and later the same day at the LEB, Tapp admitted that he had held 
Dodge's arms and shoulders down throughout the rape and 
stabbing. In his new account of the events, Jeremy Sargis was 
replaced by a different male whose name Tapp could not 
remember. Some details of his story about how Dodge was raped 
and details of other events of that night changed during this and 
two subsequent interviews. 
Tapp was rearrested after the January 29 interview. The 
next day, he was again charged with being an accessory to a 
felony. Tapp was further interviewed on January 30 and 31. On 
February 3, 1997, charges of rape, I.C. § 18-6101(3), (4), and first 
degree murder, I.C. §§ 18-4001, -4002, -4003(a), replaced the 
accessory charge. 
Tapp moved to suppress the statements that he made to 
police on the grounds that his right to counsel was violated during 
police interviews, that his statements to police were involuntary, 
and that the immunity agreements were still binding on the State. 
Before this motion was decided, Tapp's original attorneys withdrew 
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and other attorneys were appointed to represent him. The district 
court denied the suppression motion except as to statements made 
on January 11 after Tapp was arrested and before his attorney's 
arrival. 
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 357-58, 33 P.3d at 831-32 (footnote omitted). 
On appeal, Tapp challenged the district court's order denying his motion to 
suppress. (#25295 Appellant's Brief, pp.11-60.) The Court of Appeals 
concluded Tapp's "Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated by police 
procedures in [his] case" when counsel were only permitted to watch the 
interviews from another room. Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 362, 33 P.3d at 836. 
However, this did not require suppression of all of Tapp's statements. Because 
"[t]he parties agree[d] that Tapp was not in custody during the January 7, 10 and 
18 interviews ... there was no Miranda violation as to those interrogations," and 
suppression was not required. Id. With respect to the remaining interviews, the 
Court of Appeals concluded: 
As to the January 11 interview, the record shows that, except for 
the portion of the interview that was suppressed by the district 
court, Tapp's attorney was present with him in the same room 
during questioning. Therefore, Tapp has shown no violation of the 
right to counsel on January 11. The interviews of January 15, 17, 
30, and 31 all occurred while Tapp was incarcerated and formally 
charged, and it is undisputed that these were custodial 
interrogations during which Tapp was separated from his counsel. 
Therefore, all statements Tapp made to police on these dates 
should have been suppressed. 
The parties disagree as to whether Tapp was "in custody" 
during the January 29 questioning, which occurred at the LEB and 
at the crime scene. The district court made no express finding of 
fact on the issue, .... 
It is clear that Tapp w.as not under formal arrest at the time 
of his January 29 interviews. However, formal arrest is not a 
factual prerequisite to a finding of custody. For Miranda purposes, 
4 
"custody" occurs when a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to 
a degree associated with formal arrest. This is an objective test 
that is based on the totality of the circumstances; the inquiry is how 
a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood 
his situation. 
The surrounding circumstances establish that Tapp was not 
"in custody" when he was interrogated by police on January 29. 
Tapp initially appeared voluntarily at the LEB on that date with 
counsel and was told at the outset that the prosecutor considered 
the immunity agreements to be void. Despite this development, 
Tapp did not decline further interviews or invoke his privilege 
against self-incrimination. There is no evidence that the police ever 
told Tapp that he could not leave or that he had to undergo 
interrogation. At no time during questioning was he under arrest or 
led to believe that he was under arrest. In fact, an officer at one 
point told Tapp that although it was likely he would eventually be 
going to prison, he wasn't going to be put in jail that day. Tapp 
himself asked to be taken to the crime scene, where the interview 
continued and where he ultimately made some of his most self-
incriminating statements. His attorney was invited, but declined, to 
accompany him. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the 
district court did not implicitly find that Tapp was in custody during 
the January 29 interviews, and if such a finding had been made, it 
would not be supported by the record. We hold that Tapp was not 
in custody on January 29, and therefore his Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel did not attach and was not violated. Only Tapp's 
statements made on January 15, 17, 30, and 31 are suppressible 
for Fifth Amendment violations. 
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 362-36, 33 P.3d at 836-37 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted, emphasis in original). 
Tapp also claimed his statements were used in violation of his due 
process rights based on his assertion the statements were coerced and 
involuntary. Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 63, 33 P.3d at 838. The Court concluded the 
statements made during the interviews on January 7, 10, 18, and 29 were not 
suppressible under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court reasoned: 
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When Tapp was interviewed, he was twenty years old and 
had a high school education. There is no indication that he has an 
unusually low IQ or suffers from any cognitive defects. The 
interviews occurred on several days over the course of a month's 
time. They varied in length, but, with the exception of the January 
11 interview, they took place during daylight hours. Tapp does not 
argue that he was subjected to interrogations of excessive length or 
that he was deprived of food or sleep. Miranda warnings were 
given to Tapp before each interview. All of these factors weigh 
against a finding of involuntariness. 
Nevertheless, Tapp argues that the State used various 
interrogation techniques to confuse him and coerce him into saying 
whatever the police wanted to hear. First, Tapp claims that he was 
induced to confess by unkept promises of leniency. On January 
29, an investigating officer told Tapp that another immunity 
agreement could be worked out if Tapp gave the name of the 
unidentified participant in the crime. However, Tapp never gave the 
information - the name of the unidentified party - on which the offer 
of leniency was predicated. Further, this promise was not 
conditioned on Tapp admitting to having taken an active part in the 
crimes; rather, it was offered despite Tapp's having already 
admitted to actively assisting the principal perpetrators. Therefore, 
this promise could not have induced Tapp's confession. 
Tapp also claims that the police improperly used his religious 
beliefs to induce a confession. In particular, he claims that an 
officer offered him divine forgiveness through confession. Tapp's 
characterization of the conversation is not supported by the record. 
Here, although the officer discussed his own ecclesiastical beliefs 
and offered to take the confession Tapp had expressed a desire to 
make, he prefaced that offer by specifically disclaiming any power 
to grant divine absolution. References to religious sentiments are 
not coercive per se. Moreover, even if the officer's comments were 
deemed an impermissible appeal to religious sentiment, it would 
not lead to suppression of any statements because Tapp made no 
new admissions after this discussion took place. 
Finally, Tapp alleges that the police used provocative 
questions to heighten his anxiety and stress and employed 
hypothetical questions to encourage speculative responses. Tapp 
has not, however, referred us to any authority suggesting that such 
interrogation techniques are impermissible. The use of hypothetical 
questions is not inherently coercive. The police are allowed to play 
on a suspect's ignorance, fears and anxieties so long as they do 
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not magnify these emotionally charged matters to the point where a 
rational decision becomes impossible. 
Having examined the totality of the circumstances, we 
conclude that the district court properly concluded that Tapp's 
disclosures to police were not the product of police coercion. Tapp 
has not shown error in the district court's refusal to suppress 
statements he gave to police on January 7, 10, 18 and 29. 
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 364-65, 33 P.3d at 838-39 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted, emphasis in original). 
Because the Court of Appeals determined some of Tapp's statements 
should have been suppressed, it engaged in a harmless error analysis. The 
Court concluded reversal of Tapp's convictions was not required in light of the 
statements Tapp made on January 29, which were properly admitted at trial. 
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 365, 33 P.3d at 839. "Because these statements included 
explicit and highly incriminating confessions, ... the erroneous admission of 
other confessions made on other dates was harmless." Id. at 365-66, 33 P.3d at 
839-40. Specifically, the Court noted: 
On January 29, while in Dodge's apartment, Tapp admitted that he 
helped restrain Dodge when she was being raped and when Hobbs 
cut her throat. After Tapp and the officers returned to the LEB on 
the same day, Tapp admitted that he held Dodge's arms down 
while she was being raped and forced to engage in fellatio. He also 
confessed that he was holding Dodge's arms when Hobbs stabbed 
her in the chest which, according to Tapp, was the first time she 
was stabbed. He claimed to have released her arms and stood up 
immediately when that happened, implying no further participation. 
However, later in the same interview he admitted that he was also 
holding Dodge's arms when the unidentified participant stabbed 
her. Thus, in his conversations with police on January 29, Tapp 
admitted to having helped restrain Dodge while she was sexually 
attacked, while Hobbs inflicted the initial stab wound to the chest, 
while the unidentified participant again stabbed her in the chest, 
and while Hobbs cut her throat. We are confident beyond a 
reasonable doubt that if these detailed confessions made on 
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January 29 had been the only statements from Tapp heard by the 
jury, the verdict would have been the same. 
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 366, 33 P.3d at 840. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Tapp's conviction and sentences on July 
20, 2001, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied review on October 29, 2001. 
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 354, 33 P.3d at 828. 
Course Of Initial Post-Conviction Proceedings, (Docket No. 35536)2 
Tapp filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, excessive sentence, and 
a violation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), because he was not 
sentenced by a jury. (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.8-20.) Tapp's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims more specifically alleged trial counsel were ineffective by (1) 
advising him to submit to the January 29 interview in light of the state's position 
that the immunity agreement was void; (2) leaving him "alone with the officers on 
January 29;" (3) failing to accompany him to the crime scene on January 29; (4) 
failing to "investigate and/or present evidence of [Tapp's) diminished mental 
capacity" at the suppression hearing to support his claim that his "confessions 
were coerced and involuntary;" (5) failing to "present evidence of the 
circumstances of the January 29, 1997, interrogation" to demonstrate he was, in 
fact, in custody on that date; (6) failing to "investigate [Tapp's] diminished mental 
2 The district court also took judicial notice of the record from Tapp's original 
post-conviction case, Bonneville County Case No. CV-2002-6009 (Docket No. 
35536) and at least implicitly granted Tapp's motion to take judicial notice of the 
transcript from the evidentiary hearing in that case, which Tapp submitted as an 
exhibit in support of his successive petition. (R., pp.78, 99, 123-124 (considering 
testimony); Exhibits.) 
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capacity and present evidence of it prior to going to trial, and during the penalty 
phase" so the district court "could have considered whether or not [he] was 
mentally capable to stand trial" and for the district court to consider Tapp's 
"lessened culpability in light of [his] low I.Q.;" (7) failing to call Tapp as a witness 
at trial; and (8) failing to file a Rule 35 motion. (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.10-11.) 
Tapp filed a motion for appointment of counsel (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.23-
27), which the district court granted (#35536 R., Vol. I, p.32). The state 
thereafter filed an answer (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.43-44), and motion for summary 
dismissal with a supporting memorandum (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.46-56). The 
district court conducted a hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal 
after which it entered a written order granting the state's motion as to all claims 
except Tapp's claims that counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and 
raise issues regarding Tapp's competency; (2) not calling Tapp as a witness 
despite Tapp's alleged request that he do so; and (3) failing to present evidence 
of Tapp's "mental condition" at sentencing. (#35536 R., Vol. II, pp.135-61.) The 
state filed a motion to reconsider the district court's decision to not summarily 
dismiss all of his claims, contending Tapp failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact entitling him to a hearing on the three claims the court did not 
summarily dismiss because Tapp failed to (1) establish trial counsel did not 
investigate his competency or show that he was incompetent to stand trial; (2) 
specifically articulate what his trial testimony would have been and therefore 
failed to establish prejudice in relation to this claim; and (3) establish his mental 
condition would have been a significant factor at sentencing. (#35536 R., Vol. II, 
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pp.163-80.) The court conducted a hearing on the state's motion to reconsider 
and permitted Tapp to supplement the record with additional evidence. (#35536 
R., Vol. II, p.181.) Tapp subsequently submitted a written objection to the state's 
motion to reconsider (#35536 R., Vol. II, pp.183-86), and an affidavit (Affidavit of 
Christopher Tapp (hereinafter "Second Tapp Aff.") (Exhibit)). In his second 
affidavit, Tapp averred trial counsel (1) never told him he had a right to testify; (2) 
told him he was not going to call him as a witness at the preliminary hearing 
because he did not want the state to be able to use that testimony to prepare for 
trial; (3) did not prepare him to testify at trial; (4) did not "explain to the jury or [the 
court] at sentencing that [he] ha[s] a diagnosed mental illness and that influenced 
[him] in [his] cooperation with the investigators;" and (5) did not give him the 
"opportunity to testify." (Second Tapp. Aff., pp.2-3.) The state filed written 
responses to both Tapp's objection and his second affidavit. (#35536 R., Vol. II, 
pp.191-96, 200-07). 
After reconsidering its prior order denying the state's motion for summary 
dismissal of Tapp's claims in relation to his competency, his desire to testify, and 
the presentation of evidence at sentencing, and after reviewing relevant portions 
of the underlying criminal case, the district court concluded summary dismissal 
was appropriate. (#35536 R., Vol. II, pp.209-228.) 
On appeal, Tapp asserted, for the first time, "that his claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to call him as a witness should have been analyzed by 
the district court, not just as an instance of ineffective assistance of counsel, but 
also as a direct violation of his right to testify." Tapp v. State, 2010 Unpublished 
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Opinion No. 412 at p.12 (Idaho App. March 31, 2010) ("Tapp II"). The Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument because "Tapp not only pied the issue as an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but presented the issue to the district 
court as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." 1sL. The Court also rejected 
Tapp's alternative argument that he met his burden of showing ineffective 
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): 
Tapp alleges that he should have been called to testify so 
that the jury could consider his testimony in evaluating the weight to 
be given the other evidence presented at trial, most particularly, the 
videotape of the confession on January 29. Tapp's claim focuses 
on his contention that his testimony would show "how Sgt. 
Fuhriman and Detective Finn threatened me, and coerced me into 
a confession in this crime, and explain the events concerning this 
crime." Tapp also refers to the addendum setting forth his version 
of events occurring on January 29. In addition, in a supplemental 
affidavit, Tapp alleged that "I knew I had to tell the jury that the 
tapes were not true." 
During trial, Tapp's counsel attempted to expose coercive 
interrogation techniques on the part of the police. Sergeant 
Fuhriman was cross-examined on the use of coercive tactics and 
accused of coercing Tapp into his confession. Fuhriman admitted 
to using "deceptive" questioning techniques. Tapp's counsel spent 
considerable time cross-examining officers to suggest that they 
took advantage of and coached Tapp into his statements and 
confession. Thus, much of the proffered evidence was presented 
to the jury and the implications Tapp wished to raise were made 
apparent to the jury. 
While this Court stated: "The state's case was based almost 
entirely upon Tapp's confessions to having helped other men rape 
and murder Dodge; no physical evidence linked Tapp to the crime." 
Tapp, 136 Idaho at 358, 33 P.3d at 832, the State provided other 
evidence that tended to corroborate the confession. The State 
called forensic experts to testify regarding how the crime was 
committed based on the physical evidence. The crux of the State's 
case was that Tapp's confession provided accurate forensic details 
which the officers had not divulged to him prior to his confession. 
11 
The officers that interviewed Tapp testified about consistencies 
between Tapp's confession and the forensic evidence that the 
public did not know. J.S. testified that a month after the murder she 
overheard Hobbs tell a nervous Tapp to keep calm or he "was 
going to blow the alibi." D.O. testified that a few days after the 
murder she overheard Tapp say that he stabbed Dodge because 
she owed money for crank, he held her down while she was raped 
and killed, Hobbs slit her throat, and Tapp got blood on his shirt. 
J.B. lived with Tapp during the time of the murder and testified 
Tapp left the night of the murder wearing his favorite shirt and 
returned at 3:00 or 4:00 am without it and J.B. did not see the shirt 
again. A.O. testified that the morning after the murder she saw 
Hobbs down at the river with his shirt slung over his shoulder and 
crying because Dodge had been killed. Other evidence showed 
that this was before Dodge's murder had become public 
information. 
The district court determined that, since the record was 
devoid of the rationale for trial counsel not calling Tapp to testify, for 
purposes of the motion for summary dismissal, the court would 
assume that the failure to call Tapp was against his wishes and 
therefore deficient performance. The court, thus, proceeded to the 
prejudice analysis. The district court found that Tapp had failed to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding prejudice because 
Tapp did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the 
outcome would be different if Tapp had testified in light of his actual 
statements and participation in the police questioning as presented 
on the videotapes. The court concluded: 
In viewing the videotapes, the jury was able to make a 
determination whether Tapp's statements were freely and 
voluntarily given, or the subject of coercion and undue 
pressure. Based upon the Court's review of the videotapes, 
the Court finds no merit to the latter argument. In the Court's 
opinion, any testimony by Tapp at the time of trial that his 
prior statements for some reason should not be give [sic] 
credence would be given little or no weight and as such, it is 
not reasonably probable that any such testimony would 
change the outcome of the trial. To the extent counsel erred 
by not allowing Tapp to testify, such was harmless error. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
We too conclude that on this record, Tapp failed to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the second 
prong of the Strickland analysis, prejudice, that but for the 
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attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would 
have been different. The district court correctly granted summary 
dismissal of Tapp's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failure to call Tapp to testify at trial. 
Tapp 11 at pp. 13-15 (footnote omitted). 
Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the summary dismissal of Tapp's 
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Tapp to testify, and affirmed 
the denial of relief on other claims raised on appeal, it remanded the case with 
respect to Tapp's claim that counsel was ineffective for "failing to present all of 
the circumstances of the January 29 events in order to demonstrate that Tapp 
was, in fact, in custody at the time of the statements he made on that date," and 
his claim that counsel was ineffective at the suppression hearing for failing to 
present evidence of "his diminished capacity that" he believed "would have led to 
a finding that the confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed." 
Tapp II at pp.5-12. The basis for the remand was for the district court to consider 
additional facts alleged by Tapp that were not considered "in granting summary 
dismissal" since the district court erroneously concluded Tapp was precluded 
from relitigating the issues based on the Court's determinations on direct appeal 
regarding custody and the voluntariness of Tapp's confession. Tapp II at pp.7-8, 
11-12. 
Post-Conviction Proceedings Following Remand (Docket No. 40197) 
"On remand, the state again filed a motion for summary dismissal seeking 
dismissal" on Tapp's claim that counsel was ineffective during the suppression 
hearing. Tapp v. State, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 761 at pp.6-7 (Idaho App. 
Nov. 21, 2013) ('Tapp Ill"). Specifically, the state asserted a "confession is not 
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subject to suppression for involuntariness absent some evidence of police 
coercion" and "even assuming all of Tapp's newly submitted diminished mental 
capacity evidence to be true, the video recordings of Tapp's numerous 
interrogations showed that his alleged mental infirmity was not of such 
significance as to conclude, in the totality of the circumstances, that the January 
29 confession was involuntary." Tapp Ill at p.7. Tapp responded that summary 
dismissal was improper because the Court of Appeals remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing. kl The district court disagreed, determining that the Court 
of Appeals' "opinion did not mandate an evidentiary hearing" and "granted the 
State's motion for summary dismissal." kl 
Tapp again challenged the summary dismissal on appeal and the Court of 
Appeals "conclude[d] that the district court was correct" in deciding that an 
evidentiary hearing was not mandated by law of the case. Tapp Ill at pp.7-8. 
Turning to the merits of the summary dismissal, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
after finding "Tapp's challenges to the district court's judgment granting summary 
dismissal [were] without merit." Tapp Ill at pp.10-15. 
Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings (Docket No. 41056) 
On March 4, 2009, while his initial post-conviction appeal was pending, 
Tapp filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief contending he was 
denied his right to testify. (R., pp.4-7.) The state filed a motion to dismiss based 
on the successive petition bar in I. C. § 19-4908 and based on the statute of 
limitations in I.C. § 19-4902(a). (R., p.12.) Tapp filed a motion to stay pending 
resolution of his original post-conviction appeal; although the district court did not 
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rule on the motion, the case was effectively stayed until September 2012 when 
the district court entered a notice of proposed dismissal for failure to prosecute. 
(R., pp.10, 18.) Tapp filed an objection to the notice along with affidavits from 
several attorneys who represented Tapp during his original post-conviction case. 
(R., pp.20-23, 33-35, 38-40, 42-43.) Tapp also filed a response to the state's 
motion to dismiss, asserting (1) the successive petition was appropriate given the 
alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel for failing to raise a 
substantive claim that Tapp was denied the right to testify (as opposed to an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim), and (2) the successive petition was 
timely because it was filed 14 months before the conclusion of the original post-
conviction appeal. (R., pp.51-54.) Tapp also asserted his successive petition 
claim has merit. (R., pp.54-56.) In conjunction with this response to the state's 
motion to dismiss, Tapp filed an affidavit detailing his desire to testify at trial and 
that he did not intend to waive any substantive claim regarding his right to testify. 
(R., pp.59-61.) 
The district court denied the state's motion for summary dismissal, finding 
(1) Tapp "presented sufficient/prima facie evidence to the effect that counsel in 
his original petition were ineffective in failing to raise" a substantive claim 
regarding Tapp's right to testify, and (2) "the second petition was brought within a 
reasonable time." (R., pp.84-85.) The court then stated: 
While the State in its motion may have intended to assert that the 
evidence establishes a voluntary waiver of the right to testify and/or 
that the failure to testify was harmless error, it is the Court's opinion 
that the State's motion was not sufficiently specific to put Tapp on 
notice, nor does the Court believe that those issues have been fully 
addressed. Therefore, the Court on its own motion now raises the 
15 
issue of whether this matter should be summarily dismissed under 
a Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)] analysis[.] 
(R., p.86.) The court gave Tapp 30 days to respond to its notice and set 
subsequent deadlines for the state's response and Tapp's reply. (R., p.86.) 
Tapp filed a response to the court's notice, contending it was the state's 
burden to show the error was harmless and that the state could not do so. (R., 
pp.88-96.) In his response, Tapp relied on his testimony from the evidentiary 
hearing held on his original petition regarding his desire to testify and what he 
would have testified to if he had been called as a witness at trial. (R., pp.90-92.) 
Tapp then attempted to expand his claim, stating (1) he would "provide th[e] 
Court with his affidavit stating that he would also testified [sic) in support of the 
alibi defense which was presented at the criminal trial"; (2) he "could have 
supplemented his trial testimony with that of June Elizabeth Bloxhan-Nielsen" 
who testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing; and (3) "[i]n addition to 
presenting his own relevant evidence about why the confession was false, [he] 
could have presented an expert to explain how police interrogation techniques 
can cause false confessions." (R., pp.92-94.) As promised in his response, 
Tapp filed another affidavit averring that had he "been called to testify in [his] 
criminal trial [he] could have testified to everything [he] testified to at [his] 
evidentiary hearing in CV-2002-6009" and he "would have testified in support of 
[his] alibi defense at trial." (R., pp.101-102.) 
The state filed a response, noting trial counsel testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that Tapp was "adamantly opposed to testifying" at trial. (R., p.106.) 
The state also asserted Tapp's failure to testify, if error, was harmless. (R., 
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pp.107-108.) 
Tapp filed a reply claiming, in part, that the court could not consider trial 
counsel's testimony from the evidentiary hearing because it was "not the basis 
for dismissal which the Court gave notice" and the state's "suggestion" that trial 
counsel's testimony showed Tapp was not deprived of his right to testify was "not 
in response to the Court's Order ... and is logically irrelevant to the precise issue 
before the Court." (R., p.135.) Tapp further claimed that, even if trial counsel's 
testimony was considered, it only served to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
that entitled him to an evidentiary hearing. (R., p.136.) 
The court summarily dismissed Tapp's claim. (R., pp.122-133.) The court 
rejected Tapp's assertion that the court could not address whether he voluntarily 
waived his right to testify or trial counsel's prior testimony on that point and found 
that "Tapp voluntarily waived his right to testify at the time of trial." (R., pp.123-
129.) "For the sake of expediency," the court also "consider[ed] the issue of 
whether the failure to testify constitutes harmless error, even assuming Tapp did 
not voluntarily waive his right to testify." (R., p.129.) The court concluded the 
error was harmless. (R., pp.130-133.) With respect to Tapp's assertions that he 
could have testified in support of his alibi, the court found Tapp should have 
raised that claim in his original petition but nevertheless addressed the proffered 
alibi testimony and found it "would not have altered the jury's conclusion to his 
guilt." (R., pp.131-132.) 
The court entered judgment dismissing Tapp's successive petition and 
Tapp filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.144, 149-151.) 
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ISSUES 
Tapp states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the district court err because it dismissed the case on a 
ground, i.e., that Mr. Tapp's right to testify had not been violated, 
different than that raised in its notice of intent to dismiss? 
B. Assuming arguendo that the issue was raised by the court, 
did the court err by creating a new legal presumption that Mr. Tapp 
waived his right to testify by his silence at trial and then resolving 
the factual issue against him during the summary disposition 
proceedings by applying that presumption? 
C. Did the court err because it dismissed a portion of the case 
on a ground, i.e., that Mr. Tapp was barred from raising the alibi 
testimony issue because he could have raised it in his first petition, 
different than that raised in its notice of intent to dismiss? 
D. Assuming arguendo that issue was raised by the court, did 
the court err by finding the issue should have been raised in the 
first petition? 
E. Did the court err in concluding that any deprivation of the 
right to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? 
(Appellant's Opening Brief ("Appellant's Brief'), p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Tapp failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
the only claim raised in his successive post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Tapp Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing 
His Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Tapp contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
successive post-conviction petition. Tapp advances three primary arguments in 
support of his claim: (1) the court failed to provide adequate notice of the 
grounds for dismissal; (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact entitling him 
to an evidentiary hearing on whether he voluntarily waived his right to testify; and 
(3) the district court erred in conducting its harmless error analysis. (See 
generally Appellant's Brief, pp.6-40.) Review of the relevant law and the entire 
record shows Tapp has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his 
successive post-conviction petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court "will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on 
the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and 
will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party." Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). 
The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony are 
matters within the discretion of the trial court. Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 
702, 274 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). 
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The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Tapp's Claim Of Lack Of Notice Is Without Merit 
After rejecting the state's request for summary dismissal based on the 
successive petition bar and the statute of limitations, the court stated: 
While the State in its motion may have intended to assert that the 
evidence establishes a voluntary waiver of the right to testify and/or 
that the failure to testify was harmless error, it is the Court's opinion 
that the State's motion was not sufficiently specific to put Tapp on 
notice, nor does the Court believe that those issues have been 
fully addressed. 
(R., p.86 (emphasis added).) "Therefore, the Court on its own motion now raises 
the issue of whether this matter should be summarily dismissed under a 
Chapman[3] analysis[.]" (R., p.86.) The court then quoted the following excerpt 
from Rossignol: 
However, if the failure of a defendant to testify is considered in the 
context of deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right, then 
pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 
L.ed.2d 705 (1967), the defendant has the burden to show he or 
she was deprived of the right to testify, and the state must then 
convince the reviewing court beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
deprivation did not contribute to the defendant's conviction-that it 
was harmless error. 
(R., p.86 (quoting Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704, 274 P.3d at 5) (emphasis 
added).) 
3 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
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Although Tapp did not address the first part of the constitutional issue in 
his response to the court's notice, i.e., whether he was deprived of his right to 
testify (R., pp.88-96), the state, in its response, did. Specifically, the state quoted 
the following testimony by Tapp's trial counsel when he testified at the 
evidentiary hearing in Tapp's original post-conviction case: 
[Tapp] expressed on a number of occasions that he was fearful of 
taking the stand because he'd been manipulated so successfully. 
Those were not his words. But he'd become confused a number of 
times during the interview process and he was very concerned 
about becoming confused on the witness stand and he was 
adamantly opposed to testifying. Now, that's relative particularly to 
trial. Again, I don't have specific recollection about the preliminary 
hearing and discussing with [Tapp] testifying at the evidentiary 
hearing. 
(R., p.106 (quoting #40197 E.H. Tr., p.171, L.5 - p.172, L.104) (emphasis added 
by state in its response).) 
In his reply, Tapp complained about the state addressing the issue of 
whether he voluntarily waived his right, contending that issue was not included 
within the court's notice. (R., p.135.) Regardless, Tapp addressed the merits of 
the state's argument. (R., p.136.) 
In its written decision denying relief, the district court stated its prior notice 
"raised the issues of (1) whether Tapp voluntarily waived his right to testify, and if 
not (2) was the failure to testify harmless error." (R., p.123.) The court then 
proceeded to address both issues. (R., pp.123-141.) 
4 The state's response cites pages 162-163 of the evidentiary hearing transcript; 
however, the transcript prepared for appeal, which is cited herein, has the quoted 
testimony at pages 171-172. 
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On appeal, Tapp disagrees with the district court's interpretation of its own 
notice and argues, "the court never raised the issue of whether [he] voluntarily 
waived his right to testify." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Tapp further contends that, 
as a result, he was deprived of the right to notice of dismissal of his claim on this 
basis and "an opportunity to respond" and asks this Court to vacate this "portion" 
of the district court's decision and "remand for further proceedings." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.8, 10.) Tapp's notice argument should be rejected. 
Although Tapp assumed the district court's notice did not include the 
threshold issue of whether Tapp was denied his right to testify, the notice can 
easily be construed otherwise, and it is clear from the district court's decision that 
it believed the issue was open for consideration. That Tapp interpreted the 
language differently does not mean he was not given adequate notice. Cf. 
DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009) (cannot 
challenge the adequacy of notice for the first time on appeal). In any event, the 
purpose of providing notice of the grounds for dismissal under I.C. § 19-4906(b) 
is to give the petitioner "an opportunity to respond and to establish a material fact 
issue" in order to avoid summary dismissal. Flores v. State, 128 Idaho 476, 478, 
915 P.2d 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). Since Tapp actually 
responded to the waiver issue, even arguing, in part, that the state's reliance on 
trial counsel's testimony created a genuine issue of material fact, it is difficult to 
understand how he was meaningfully deprived of notice, much less an 
opportunity to respond. It is also unclear what purpose would be served by 
remand in light of the fact that Tapp responded to the issue. This Court should, 
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therefore, decline Tapp's request to "vacate the order and remand for further 
proceedings" on this basis. 
D. There Was No Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Tapp To An 
Evidentiary Hearing 
"The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie 
case by presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his or her 
claims." DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 601, 200 P.3d at 1150 (citation omitted). As 
noted by the district court in its notice, it is the defendant's burden to show he 
was deprived of his right to testify. Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704, 274 P.3d at 5. 
The district court, relying on federal circuit court precedent, determined 
Tapp failed to meet his burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact "that 
trial counsel refused to allow him to testify." (R., pp.123-129.) The court 
reasoned: 
... Tapp relies upon his bare assertion that trial counsel refused to 
allow him to testify. Rather than corroborating this assertion, it is 
the testimony of trial counsel that he discussed with Tapp whether 
Tapp should testify, with Tapp making the decision that he would 
not testify. There is nothing in the record reflecting that Tapp made 
any objection to the trial judge to the effect that he wanted to testify 
or was not satisfied with trial counsel and the decision not to call 
Tapp as a witness. Based on the foregoing case law, Tapp's 
silence at the time of trial at the very least creates a presumption 
that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify. Tapp's 
belated testimony alone in post-conviction proceedings that he 
wanted to testify is insufficient to rebut that presumption. Based on 
the foregoing, the Court finds that Tapp voluntarily waived his right 
to testify at the time of trial. 
(R., p.129.) 
On appeal, Tapp claims the court erred in making this determination 
because, he argues, the court could not resolve the "controverted issue" without 
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an evidentiary hearing. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Tapp further contends that, 
"even if the court were allowed to weigh conflicting evidence, it still reached the 
wrong conclusion." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Tapp's arguments fail. 
In Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008), 
the Court acknowledged that "an applicant's uncontroverted factual allegations .. 
are deemed to be true" but stated that "because the trial court rather than a jury 
will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary hearing, summary disposition 
is permissible, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from 
the facts, for the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between 
those inferences." In other words, "the judge in a post-conviction action is not 
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for 
summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to 
be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." J.s:L. 
Tapp contends Hayes "does not apply here" because the facts in this case 
are controverted. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) The state submits, however, that it 
was appropriate for the court to find Tapp voluntarily waived his rights because 
the record contradicts his claim. As explained in McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 
570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (quotations and citation omitted), "Allegations 
contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when ( 1) they 
are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not 
justify relief as a matter of law."5 In the original post-conviction proceedings, trial 
5 The state recognizes that the district court engaged in a different analysis of 
this issue; however, this Court may affirm on the correct theory. See, ~. 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999). 
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counsel testified that Tapp was "adamantly opposed to testifying" at trial. 
(#40197 Tr., p.172, Ls.3-7.) Tapp did not dispute this assertion at the time and 
his claim that he wanted to testify but counsel refused to let him are inconsistent 
with his prior testimony that when he asked if it would be "proper" for him to 
testify at the suppression hearing, he was "shot down" and did not question that 
decision because he "trusted [counsel's] judgment." (#400197 Tr., p.140, Ls.11-
22.) Tapp also testified that he did not tell trial counsel about the "issues" he 
later raised in relation to the January 29 interview because he "believed in" trial 
counsel, "believed in everything [trial counsel] was doing," thought counsel had 
his "best interest in mind," and "believed that [counsel] was doing everything he 
could to help." (#40197 Tr., p.144, Ls.5-14.) It strains logic to believe that Tapp 
was any less willing to follow counsel's advice with respect to testifying at trial 
and counsel's testimony that Tapp, in fact, did not want to testify at trial because 
he was afraid he would get manipulated on the stand is entirely consistent with 
Tapp's position that that is exactly what happened when he was interviewed by 
law enforcement. 
Tapp's current attempt to undermine this testimony by calling it "non-
responsive" to the question asked and irrelevant to the suppression issue being 
discussed at the prior hearing does not mean it should be disregarded for 
purposes of determining whether the record contradicts Tapp's claim that he 
wanted to testify but his trial counsel prevented him from doing so. Further, as 
Tapp acknowledges, the district court resolved credibility issues against Tapp at 
the prior hearing. (Appellant's Brief, p.34 n.11.) Under the unique circumstances 
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of this case, where there has already been relevant testimony considered by the 
district court, and credibility determinations made, no purpose would be served 
by holding another evidentiary hearing for Tapp to refute counsel's testimony that 
Tapp did not want to testify. 6 
E. Tapp Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That 
Any Deprivation Of Tapp's Right To Testify Was Harmless 
If deprivation of the right to testify did not contribute to the defendant's 
conviction, the error is harmless. Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704, 274 P.3d at 5. 
The district court determined that, "even assuming Tapp did not voluntarily waive 
his right to testify," the error was harmless because Tapp's proffered testimony 
"would not have altered the jury's conclusion as to his guilt." (R., pp.129-132.) 
Tapp raises several complaints about the district court's harmless error 
analysis. First, Tapp contends the court erred in "refus[ing] to consider any of 
[his] allegations regarding his alibi defense." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) This 
assertion lacks merit. 
In his successive petition, Tapp alleged, in relevant part, that "trial counsel 
refused to permit [him] to testify at the criminal trial even though [he] specifically 
asked to testify." (R., p.5.) Tapp filed a supporting affidavit in which he reiterated 
his desire to testify and averred: 
6 The state acknowledges that, in Rossignol, the Court of Appeals stated, "a 
defendant may not be found to have waived his or her right to testify at trial 
unless the defendant was aware that he or she not only had such right, but also 
the ultimate right to decide whether to testify regardless of counsel's advice." 
152 Idaho at 709, 24 P.3d at 10. This holding does not preclude the district 
court's finding in this case because the record supports the conclusion that Tapp 
was aware he had the right and that he was the one who did not wish to exercise 
it. 
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8. I did not voluntarily agree to not testify due to [trial counsel's] 
advice. I did not know that I had the right to testify even if [counsel] 
didn't want me to testify and believed it was his decision to make. 
9. If I had known that I had the final say on the question, I 
would have testified because I knew I had to tell the jury that 
things I said on the tapes were not true and that I had been 
manipulated into saying those things. 
(R., pp.59-60 (emphasis added).) 
It was not until Tapp filed his response to the court's notice that he claimed 
he also could have offered testimony in support of his alibi defense. (R., p.92.) 
The district court took issue with Tapp effectively amending his claim in this 
manner. The court stated, in part: "[A]llegations of an alibi defense will not be 
considered. The failure to raise the subject alibi allegations as ineffective 
assistance of counsel and/or a constitutional violation in the first Petition preclude 
the consideration of alibi allegations in this successive petition." (R., p.131.) 
Although the foregoing comments were made in the context of an analysis citing 
I.C. § 19-2719 (R., p.131), which the state concedes applies only to capital 
cases, the court's "objection" to Tapp's attempt to alter his claim by adding 
proposed alibi testimony to his original assertion that he wanted to testify so he 
could "tell the jury that things [he] said on the tapes were not true and that [he] 
had been manipulated into saying those things" was well-founded. The entire 
basis for Tapp's successive petition was that the claim from his original petition, 
that he wanted to testify but counsel prevented him from doing so, was raised 
only as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, not a substantive right to 
testify claim. That claim has always been centered on Tapp's desire to explain 
the circumstances surrounding his confession, not to support his alibi defense. 
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(#35536, 11/5/2007 Tr., pp.32-33; #40197, E.H. Tr., pp.30-156.) The court would 
have been justified in declining to consider Tapp's new assertions under the 
circumstances. See Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, _, 314 P.3d 587, 591 
(2013) ("Fields cannot cure these factual shortcomings in his petition with 
supplemental affidavits filed months after his petition."); cf. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 
523, 236 P.3d at 1283 ("It is clearly established under Idaho law that a cause of 
action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary 
judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal.") (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
That said, Tapp is incorrect in his assertion that the court ultimately 
"refused to consider any of [his] allegations regarding his alibi defense." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Although the district court initially said the allegations 
would "not be considered," it later stated: "even if Tapp testified at trial regarding 
an alibi, it is the conclusion of this Court when considering the record, there is no 
reasonable doubt that had Tapp testified regarding an alleged alibi, such 
testimony would not have altered the jury's conclusion as to his guilt." (R., 
p.132.) This conclusion was correct. 
Tapp presented an alibi defense at trial through other witnesses. (#25295 
Tr., Vol. 11, pp.1416-1455.) The jury, by its verdicts, clearly rejected that defense. 
There is no reasoned basis for concluding that the jury would have accepted that 
defense if Tapp would have taken the stand and confirmed what other witnesses 
already said. Even if Tapp had testified and agreed with his alibi witnesses, the 
jury still would have found him guilty. 
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Tapp next complains that the district court, in conducting its harmless error 
analysis, did not "distinguish[ ] between the evidence actually admitted at trial 
and the evidence which would be admissible at a new trial" in light of the Court of 
Appeals' finding of error in Tapp I. (Appellant's Brief, p.27.) Tapp cites no 
authority for the proposition that a harmless error analysis under Chapman is so 
limited and caselaw suggests that the reviewing court considers the evidence 
that was presented in deciding whether a deprivation of the right to testify was 
harmless. See, gJL, Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 709, 274 P.3d at 10; cf. State v. 
Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct. App. 2010) (evaluation of 
sufficiency of the evidence includes all evidence admitted, even if admission was 
erroneous). Tapp's suggestion that the court could not consider evidence of his 
statements that the Court of Appeals determined should have been suppressed 
also fails to take into consideration that, had he testified in the manner he claims 
he should have been "allowed" to testify, those statements would have been 
admissible as impeachment. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 201 (1998) 
(recognizing that state may introduce "statements elicited from a defendant in 
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 
(1966), for the purpose of impeachment, so long as the jury is instructed that 
such evidence may not be considered for the purpose of determining guilt") 
(citations omitted). 
Finally, Tapp contends the court erred in deciding the error was harmless 
based on his view of the flaws of certain evidence presented at trial and his 
assertion that he "could have supplemented his trial testimony with that of June 
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Elizabeth Bloxhan-Nielsen" who testified at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing and, "[i]n addition to presenting his own relevant evidence about why 
[his] confession was false, [he] could have presented an expert to explain how 
police interrogation techniques can cause false confessions." (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.23-40.) Tapp's own view of the testimony of a few witnesses does not show 
his failure to testify was not harmless. A harmless error analysis in this context 
considers all of the evidence presented at trial in relation to what the defendant 
would have contributed had he testified at trial. 
With respect to Tapp's desire to testify to explain how his confession was 
coerced, the issue of coercion was explored at trial through the cross-
examination of Detective Fuhriman. See Tapp II at p.13. Moreover, the jury was 
able to view the videotape of the confession to assess, on its own, the validity of 
Tapp's confession. Having Tapp testify would not have changed the jury's 
assessment of this evidence; if anything, it would have opened Tapp up to 
potentially damaging cross-examination and exposed him to the very concerns 
trial counsel testified Tapp had about testifying in the first instance. Compare 
Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 709, 27 4 P.3d at 10 (noting as part of its harmless error 
analysis in relation to deprivation of defendant's right to testify that defendant's 
"presence on the stand would have exposed him to cross-examination about the 
thousands of pornographic images and the incest stories on his computer"). Nor 
is it appropriate for Tapp to claim the error was not harmless because if he had 
testified he would have also presented other witnesses to corroborate his 
testimony. (Appellant's Brief, pp.36, 38.) Such testimony could have been 
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presented regardless of whether Tapp testified and any claim that trial counsel 
should have presented that evidence, alone or in conjunction with Tapp's 
testimony, was not alleged in Tapp's successive petition and could not have 
been properly alleged because it is a claim Tapp could have raised in his original 
petition. See I. C. § 19-4908. 
For the reasons stated, any testimony from Tapp explaining why he 
confessed and claiming, as did other witnesses, that he had an alibi would not 
have changed the outcome. Thus, even assuming Tapp was deprived of his 
right to testify, the district court correctly concluded the error was harmless. 
Summary dismissal of Tapp's successive petition was, therefore, appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
summary dismissal of Tapp's successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
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